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PRIVACY VERSUS SECURITY
DEREK E. BAMBAUER*
Legal scholarship tends to conflate privacy and security. However,
security and privacy can, and should, be treated as distinct concerns.
Privacy discourse involves difficult normative decisions about competing
claims to legitimate access to, use of, and alteration of information. It is
about selecting among different philosophies and choosing how various
rights and entitlements ought to be ordered. Security implements those
choices—it mediates between information and privacy selections. This
Article argues that separating privacy from security has important
practical consequences. Security failings should be penalized more readily
and more heavily than privacy ones, both because there are no competing
moral claims to resolve and because security flaws make all parties worse
off. Currently, security flaws are penalized too rarely, and privacy ones too
readily. The Article closes with a set of policy questions highlighted by the
privacy-versus-security distinction that deserve further research.
I. PRIVACY VERSUS SECURITY
Acxiom is one of the world’s foremost data mining companies. The
company’s databases contain information on over half a billion consumers,
with an average of 1,500 transactions or data points per consumer.1 It
processes one billion such records each day.2 Each consumer receives a
unique numeric identifier, allowing Acxiom to track and classify them by
location, credit card usage history, and even interests.3 Acxiom earns over
a billion dollars annually by selling this data to companies that want to
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1 Natasha Singer, You for Sale: A Data Giant Is Mapping, and Sharing, the Consumer
Genome, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2012, at B1.
2 Richard Behar, Never Heard of Acxiom? Chances Are It’s Heard of You, FORTUNE,
Feb. 23, 2004, at 140.
3 Id. at 144.
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market their wares more effectively.4 If Big Data has an epicenter, it is
likely located in Conway, Arkansas, where Acxiom’s server farm can be
found.5
Even giants make mistakes. In February 2003, Acxiom provided a
defense contractor with the Social Security numbers of passengers who
flew on JetBlue flights.6 The contractor used one of those Social Security
numbers in a PowerPoint presentation, and that passenger’s information
quickly became public.7 The disclosure led to intense criticism of the
company and to a complaint to the Federal Trade Commission.8
And, in 2002 and 2003, hackers penetrated Acxiom’s computers,
accessing records on millions of American consumers. Acxiom failed to
detect the breaches; rather, the attacks were noticed first by local law
enforcement and then by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 9
Indeed, in the 2003 case, Acxiom had no idea its systems had been
compromised until a Cincinnati sheriff turned up compact discs filled with
the company’s records while searching the home of a systems administrator
for a marketing firm.10 It was only while the FBI was investigating the case
that agents stumbled upon a second group of hackers who had broken into
Acxiom’s server three times the prior year.11 The Cincinnati systems
administrator captured the sensitive data while it was being transferred via
File Transfer Protocol (FTP), without encryption, from a server outside
Acxiom’s firewall—the equivalent, in security terms, of writing it on a
postcard sent through regular mail.12
Thus, Acxiom exposed sensitive consumer data three times—once
through a deliberate choice and twice through incompetence. Privacy
advocates were outraged in each instance. This Article argues, though, that
these cases—the disclosure, and the hacks—should be treated differently.
The disclosure is a privacy problem, and the hacks are a security problem.
While legal scholars tend to conflate privacy and security, they are distinct

4

Id. at 140.
Singer, supra note 1, at B1.
6 See Behar, supra note 2, at 140.
7 Id. at 146.
8 Marilyn Adams & Dan Reed, Passengers Sue JetBlue for Sharing Their Data, USA
TODAY, Sept. 24, 2003, at 3B.
9 Behar, supra note 2, at 142; Linda Rosencrance, Acxiom Database Hacked: Sensitive
Information Was Downloaded but Apparently Not Distributed, COMPUTERWORLD (Aug. 8,
2003, 12:00 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/83854/Acxiom_database_
hacked.
10 Behar, supra note 2, at 140.
11 Id. at 142.
12 Id. at 148; Rosencrance, supra note 9.
5
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concerns. Privacy establishes a normative framework for deciding who
should legitimately have the capability to access and alter information.
Security implements those choices. A counterintuitive consequence of this
distinction is that law should punish security failures more readily and
harshly than privacy ones. Incompetence is worse than malice.
Security, in contrast to privacy, is the set of technological mechanisms
(including, at times, physical ones) that mediates requests for access or
control.13 If someone wants access to your online banking site, he needs
your username, password, and personal identification number (your
credentials).14 The security of your online banking is determined by the
software on the bank’s server and by who knows your credentials. If
someone wants access to your paper health records, they need physical
access to your physician’s file room. The security of your health records is
determined by the physical configuration of the office and by who holds a
copy of the key to it. As a privacy matter, you might want only your doctor
and her medical staff to have access to your records. As a security matter,
the office’s cleaning staff might have a key that lets them into the file
room.15
The differences between privacy and security matter. Security defines
which privacy choices can be implemented. For example, if your entire
electronic medical record is secured by a single mechanism (such as a
password), it is not possible to enforce selective access, so that your
dermatologist can see information about your sunscreen use but not about
your antidepressant use. And privacy dictates how security’s options
should be implemented, the circumstances under which they are
appropriate, and the directions in which they ought to develop.
Distinguishing between privacy and security is unusual in legal
scholarship. Most academics and advocates treat the two concerns as
interchangeable or as inextricably intertwined. Jon Mills, for example,
treats encryption and authentication—classic security technologies—as
methods of protecting privacy.16 For Mills, any “disclosure without consent

13 Leslie P. Francis & John G. Francis, Informatics and Public-Health Surveillance, in
BIOINFORMATICS LAW: LEGAL ISSUES FOR COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY IN THE POST-GENOME
ERA 191 (Jorge L. Contreras & Jamie Cuticchia eds., 2013) (“‘[S]ecurity’ [refers] to means
for assuring adherence to specified data protections.”).
14 See generally Patco Constr. Co., Inc. v. People’s United Bank, 684 F.3d 197 (1st Cir.
2012) (reversing summary judgment for defendant bank, which approved suspicious,
fraudulent transfers after attackers correctly supplied customers’ credentials).
15 See, e.g., Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Jackson Files Said Breached, L.A. TIMES, June 11,
2010, at AA1; Chris Dimick, Reports Pour in Under CA’s New Privacy Laws, J. AHIMA
(July 7, 2009, 1:40 PM), http://journal.ahima.org/2009/07/07/cas-new-privacy-laws.
16 JON L. MILLS, PRIVACY: THE LOST RIGHT 301–02 (2008).
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gives rise to privacy concerns.”17 Similarly, Viktor Mayer-Schönberger
takes up the possibilities of digital rights management (DRM) technology
as a privacy solution.18 Mayer-Schönberger contemplates using the locks
and keys of DRM as a mechanism to implement restrictions on who can
access personal information.19 Yet the difficulties he rightly recognizes in
his proposal, such as comprehensiveness, resistance to circumvention, and
granularity, are those of security, not privacy.20 DRM is not privacy at all:
it is security.
Placing it in the wrong category causes nearly
insurmountable conceptual difficulties. In assessing privacy protections on
social networking services, such as Facebook and Orkut, Ruben Rodrigues
focuses on privacy controls (which enable users to limit access to
information), and distinguishes data security mechanisms (which protect
users from inadvertent breaches or deliberate hacks).21 Yet both, in fact, are
aspects of security, not privacy. Here, too, the wrong classification creates
problems. Rodrigues grapples with problems of access by third-party
programs, which could be malware or a competitor’s migration tool; user
practices of sharing login information; and authentication standards.22 Each
issue is made clearer when realigned as a security matter.
While some privacy scholarship has recognized the privacy–security
distinction rather murkily, it has not yet been explored rigorously or
systematically. For example, Charles Sykes treats cryptography as
conferring privacy, but then later quotes cypherpunk Eric Hughes, who
writes, “Privacy in an open society requires cryptography. If I say
something, I want it heard only by those for whom I intend it.”23 This
correctly recognizes that privacy and security (as implemented through
cryptography) are different, though complementary. Ira Rubenstein,
17

Id. at 58.
VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL
AGE 144–54 (2009). Digital rights management systems manage what actions a user can
take with digital information (e.g., whether she can open, copy, or print material), such as an
e-book. See generally Digital Rights Management (DRM) & Libraries, AM. LIBR. ASS’N,
http://www.ala.org/advocacy/copyright/digitalrights (last visited Mar. 16, 2013) (explaining
DRM).
19 MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, supra note 18, at 144–54.
20 Id. at 148–54.
21 Ruben Rodrigues, Privacy on Social Networks: Norms, Markets, and Natural
Monopoly, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: SPEECH, PRIVACY, AND REPUTATION 237, 242 (Saul
Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2010).
22 Id. at 248–54.
23 CHARLES J. SYKES, THE END OF PRIVACY 167–69 & n.* (1999).
Cypherpunks
advocate the use of technological self-help, such as through encryption, as a check on
government and corporate power. See, e.g., Eric Hughes, A Cypherpunk’s Manifesto (Mar.
9, 1993) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://w2.eff.org/Privacy/Crypto/
Crypto_misc/cypherpunk.manifesto.
18
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Ronald Lee, and Paul Schwartz seem implicitly to understand the
distinction, though they do not leverage it, in their analysis of privacyenhancing technologies.24 Thus, in assessing why users have not embraced
anonymization tools, they concentrate principally on security risks, such as
the possibility of attacks against these tools or of drawing attention from
government surveillance. Peter Swire and Lauren Steinfeld formally treat
security and privacy separately, but conflate the roles of the two concepts.25
For example, Swire and Steinfeld discuss the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act’s (HIPAA) Privacy Rule but lump in security
considerations.26 And Paul Schwartz and Ted Janger see analogous
functioning by information privacy norms, which “insulate personal data
from different kinds of observation by different parties.”27 That is exactly
what security does, but unlike norms, security restrictions have real bite.
Norms can be violated; security must be hacked. Rudeness is far easier to
accomplish than decryption.
The one privacy scholar who comes closest to recognizing the
distinction between security and privacy is Daniel Solove. In his article on
identity theft, Solove analyzes the interaction (along the lines of work by
Joel Reidenberg28 and Larry Lessig29 exploring how code can operate as
law) between architecture and privacy.30 Solove’s view of architecture is a
holistic one, incorporating analysis of physical architecture, code,
communications media, information flow, and law. Solove assesses the
way architecture shapes privacy. This is similar to, but distinct from, this
Article’s argument, which is that security implements privacy. Moreover,
the security concept is less holistic: it assesses precautions against a
determined attacker, one unlikely to be swayed by social norms or even the

24 Ira S. Rubinstein et al., Data Mining and Internet Profiling: Emerging Regulatory and
Technological Approaches, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 261, 276–80 (2008) (discussing why users
have not embraced privacy-protecting technologies such as anonymizers and pseudonyms).
25 Peter P. Swire & Lauren B. Steinfeld, Security and Privacy After September 11: The
Health Care Example, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1522 (2002) (“Both privacy and security
share a complementary goal—stopping unauthorized access, use, and disclosure of personal
information.”). Security’s goal is stopping unauthorized access. Privacy’s goal is to define
what is treated as “unauthorized.”
26 Id. at 1524–25.
27 Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Information
Privacy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1251–52 (2002).
28
Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules
Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 568–76 (1998).
29 Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662–65 (1998).
30 Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of Vulnerability, 54
HASTINGS L.J. 1227, 1238–43 (2003).
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threat of ex post punishment.31
Finally, Helen Nissenbaum’s recent work is instructive about the
differences between these two concepts, although it is not a distinction she
draws directly. She argues that standard theories of privacy devolve, both
descriptively and normatively, into focusing upon either constraints upon
access to, or forms of control over, personal information.32 This
encapsulation points out the problems inherent in failing to recognize how
privacy differs from security. An individual may put forth a set of claims
about who should be able to access her personal information or what level
of control she should have over it.33 Those claims describe a desired end
state—the world as she wants it to be regarding privacy. However, those
claims are unrelated to who can access her personal information or what
level of control she has over it at present. More important, those normative
claims are unrelated to overall access and control, not only now, but into
the future, and perhaps in the past. A given state of privacy may be
desirable even if it is not achievable.
This Article next explores how privacy involves making normative
choices.
II. PRIVACY
At base, privacy issues are arguments about values. Privacy debates
are some of the most contentious in information law. Scholars and courts
disagree about virtually everything: the theoretical bases and contours of
privacy rights;34 the relative merits of free-expression rights versus
privacy;35 the risks posed by de-identified data;36 the virtues of a “right to

31

See, e.g., Ebenezer A. Oladimeji et al., Security Threat Modeling and Analysis: A
Goal-Oriented Approach 1, 4–5 (Nov. 13–15, 2006) (paper presented at the 10th IASTED
International Conference on Software Engineering and Applications).
32 HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY
OF SOCIAL LIFE 69–71 (2010).
33 Id.
34 See, e.g., AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY (1999); DANIEL J. SOLOVE,
UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2008); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); Richard
A. Posner, The Economics of Privacy, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 405 (1981).
35 See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011) (striking down a
Vermont statute forbidding drug detailers from obtaining prescription data); Snyder v.
Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011) (rejecting tort liability for infliction of emotional
distress for protests at a military funeral).
36 Compare Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising
Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010) (critiquing release of de-identified
data as risky), with Jane Yakowitz, Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1
(2011) (criticizing Ohm’s analysis and lauding the benefits of de-identified data).
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be forgotten”;37 and the benefits of ad-supported media versus Internet
users’ interests in not being tracked online.38 What makes these debates so
important, and heated, is that they embody a clash between values and
policies that have legitimate claims for our attention.39
The answers to those arguments can rarely be resolved empirically;
rather, they depend upon one’s prior normative commitments. Privacy, as
scholars such as Daniel Solove,40 Danielle Citron,41 Anita Allen,42 and
Helen Nissenbaum43 remind us, is no longer about a binary division
between data revealed and data concealed. It is about competing claims to
information. Put crudely, privacy theory supplies an account of who should
be permitted to access, use, and alter data, and why those particular actors
should be viewed as having legitimate entitlements thereto.
Privacy is about power.44 It is about how law allocates power over
information. Consider one’s banking habits. Federal banking regulations
(implemented pursuant to the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act) require that firms
safeguard consumers’ data45 and that they provide those consumers with
annual descriptions of their privacy practices related to that data.46 The
mandates are geared almost entirely to notification, however. Consumers
have no legal entitlement to their data; their only right is to opt out of
having it shared with non-affiliated third parties.47 (Even this entitlement
has exceptions, such as for joint marketing programs.48) Customers have no

37

See, e.g., Norberto Nuno Gomes de Andrade, Oblivion: The Right to Be Different . . .
from Oneself: Reproposing the Right to Be Forgotten, 13 REVISTA DE INTERNET, DERECHO Y
POLITICA [J. INTERNET L. & POL.] 122, 134 (2012) (Spain) (arguing for the individual right to
removal of old or obsolescent personal information). But see, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Right
to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88 (2012) (criticizing proposal on free speech
grounds); Jane Yakowitz, More Bad Ideas from the E.U., FORBES (Jan. 25, 2012, 3:57 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/01/25/more-bad-ideas-from-the-e-u/
(criticizing proposal on accuracy and free speech grounds).
38 Natasha Singer, Mediator Joins Contentious Effort to Add a ‘Do Not Track’ Option to
Web Browsing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2012, at B2 (describing efforts to forge an Internet
standard that balances ad-supported media with individual claims to privacy).
39 See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus
Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151 (2004).
40 SOLOVE, supra note 34.
41 Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private
Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241 (2007).
42 ANITA L. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE HIDE? (2011).
43 NISSENBAUM, supra note 32.
44
Cf. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
45 16 C.F.R. § 314 (2012) (implementing 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801(b), 6805(b)(2) (2006)).
46 Id. §§ 313.5–313.18.
47 Id. § 313.10(a).
48 Id. § 313.13(a); see also id. §§ 313.14–313.15 (noting other exceptions).
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capability to prevent data sharing with third parties affiliated with their
banks. Their sole recourse—which is rarely, if ever, exercised for privacy
reasons—is to switch financial providers.
Firms record and trade in consumers’ financial data. That means it
holds value. And the law confers that value upon the provider rather than
upon the consumer. This has two effects. Most immediately, it makes the
financial firm relatively richer and the individual consumer relatively
poorer. Second, and more subtly, it impedes development of a consumerside market for financial data.49 A recurring puzzle of privacy law is why
markets for consumers’ information, where the consumer accepts bids for
her data, have failed to develop.50 Here, the puzzle likely arises from
information asymmetry: the consumer does not know what data the bank
holds about her, what it is worth to the bank, or what it is worth to her.51
Comparing the privacy policies of various providers imposes some cost;
moreover, such policies tend to be vague (because the law permits them to
be)52 and largely invariant (because there is little competitive advantage to
offering heterogeneous terms and because banks rationally set their defaults
to maximize their information returns).53
Regardless of how well financial privacy regulation actually functions,
it inarguably implements a set of normative choices. This allocation of
value might be optimal. It could represent either an efficient set of defaults
or an efficient societal outcome.54 Providing consumers greater control
over their information might impose unacceptable costs, or perhaps
financial data simply does not seem sensitive enough to require greater
protections. This regulatory architecture could result from public choice
considerations: financial firms hold a concentrated pecuniary interest in the

49

See Tony Vila et al., Why We Can’t Be Bothered to Read Privacy Policies: Models of
Privacy Economics as a Lemons Market, in ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SECURITY 143,
143–52 (L. Jean Camp & Stephen Lewis eds., 2004).
50 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Irrational Privacy?, 10 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
241 (2012); Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy
Policies, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543 (2008); Jan Whittington & Chris Jay
Hoofnagle, Unpacking Privacy’s Price, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1327 (2012).
51 See JAMES P. NEHF, OPEN BOOK: THE FAILED PROMISE OF INFORMATION PRIVACY IN
AMERICA 134–36 (2012); NISSENBAUM, supra note 32, at 105–06; Paul Schwartz, Property,
Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2097 (2004).
52 16 C.F.R. § 313.6.
53 See Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1635, 1639
(2011) (stating that other than design and interactive features, “the only other contractual
terms on virtually every website are standard-form”).
54 See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 85–87 (2008) (noting the importance of
well-chosen default settings, especially where consumers rarely change default settings).
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data, while consumers’ interests are diffuse.55 Financial firms have
experience lobbying regulators; consumers do not.56 Default entitlement
settings along with disclosure, alienability, and liability rules all operate to
confer the value of consumer financial data to banks rather than customers.
Privacy allocations occur outside the commercial context as well.
Records of gun ownership often have stringent privacy safeguards: in many
states, they are not accessible to the public,57 and even government actors
face limits58—the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives is
the only federal agency empowered to trace firearms in criminal
investigations.59 These rules may be sensible on a number of grounds: they
could safeguard important constitutional values inherent in the Second
Amendment, protect gun owners from being targeted for theft, or ensure
that government does not treat citizens who own guns differently from
those who do not.60 But, counternarratives are possible. Privacy in gun
ownership records prevents an estranged spouse from learning that her
husband has purchased a gun.61 It keeps parents from knowing which of
their children’s friends live in households where a firearm is present and,
therefore, from deciding whether to let them visit those friends.62
Information about firearm ownership is power, as concealed carry laws
make plain.63 The privacy rules regarding that ownership allocate power to
the gun owner and away from those who interact with her. That choice
may be appropriate or not, but it is definitely a choice.

55 Lynn A. Stout, Uncertainty, Dangerous Optimism, and Speculation: An Inquiry into
Some Limits of Democratic Governance, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1177, 1195–96 (2012).
56 See generally Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64
STAN. L. REV. 191 (2012).
57 Kelsey M. Swanson, Comment, The Right to Know: An Approach to Gun Licenses and
Public Access to Government Records, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1579, 1583–88 (2009).
58 See 18 U.S.C. § 926(a) (2006).
59 National Tracing Center, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES,
http://www.atf.gov/publications/factsheets/factsheet-national-tracing-center.html (last visited
Mar. 17, 2013).
60 Elaine Vullmahn, Comment, Firearm Transaction Disclosure in the Digital Age:
Should the Government Know What Is in Your Home?, 27 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 497, 518–26 (2010).
61 James A. Mercy & Linda E. Saltzman, Fatal Violence Among Spouses in the United
States, 1976–85, 79 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 595, 596 (1989) (“Firearms were used in the
perpetration of 71.5[%] of spouse homicides from 1976 to 1986.”).
62 See, e.g., Mathew Miller et al., Firearm Availability and Unintentional Firearm
Deaths, 33 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 477 (2001).
63 See, e.g., M. Alex Johnson, In Florida and Illinois, Concealed-Weapons Debate Lays
Bare the Politics of Gun Control, NBC NEWS (Dec. 13, 2012, 5:58 PM),
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/12/13/15889808-in-florida-and-illinois-concealedweapons-debate-lays-bare-the-politics-of-gun-control?lite.
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Privacy, as these two examples demonstrate, is about clashing interests
and values, and about the difficult task of choosing among them. Shifts in
privacy rules nearly always burden some stakeholders while benefiting
others. Rule configurations are justified by recourse to value frameworks:
efficiency, distributive justice, or religious prohibitions.64 And these
configurations describe how privacy ought to function. Security, by
contrast, describes how privacy does function.
III. SECURITY
Security implements privacy’s choices. Security determines who
actually can access, use, and alter data.65 When security settings permit an
actor without a legitimate claim to data to engage in one of these activities,
we do not view that fact as altering the normative calculus. The actor’s
moral claim does not change. The access or use is simply error. Security,
therefore, is the interface layer between information and privacy. It
mediates privacy rights, putting them into effect. Security is the bridge
between data and those who consume it.66 Security’s debates are more
cold-blooded and technical—they are about relative informational
advantages, the ability to bear costs, and the magnitude and probability of
harm.67 Like precautions against civil harms (the domain of tort law),
security measures exist along a continuum.68 Perfection is generally
unattainable or unaffordable.69 Where there are normative choices—such
as who should bear residual risk—they tend to be more deeply buried, or
subsumed in utilitarian methodologies.
Formally, then, security is agnostic about how privacy rules dictate
selection of who may interact with data. The capability to access or alter

64

Privacy discourse often fails to make these normative commitments explicit.
However, the best privacy scholarship sets forth clearly its bases for favoring a particular
regime. See, e.g., NISSENBAUM, supra note 32, at 129–57.
65 See Derek E. Bambauer, Conundrum, 96 MINN. L. REV. 584, 628–32 (2011)
(discussing access and alteration).
66 On this account, the absence of security may well reflect a normative choice, and
perhaps that should be the default assumption.
67 See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Rules, Standards, and Geeks, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. &
COM. L. 49 (2010); Hans Brechbühl et al., Protecting Critical Information Infrastructure:
Developing Cybersecurity Policy, 16 INFO. TECH. FOR DEV. 83, 85–87 (2010); Michel van
Eeten & Johannes M. Bauer, Emerging Threats to Internet Security: Incentives, Externalities
and Policy Implications, 17 J. CONTINGENCIES & CRISIS MGMT. 221, 225–29 (2009); Vincent
R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort Liability, 57 S.C. L. REV.
255, 299–303 (2005).
68 See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Individual Precautions to Prevent Theft: Private Versus
Socially Optimal Behavior, 11 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 123 (1991).
69 Derek E. Bambauer, The Myth of Perfection, 2 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 22 (2012).
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data can be granted to all users or none, it can be added or revoked, and it
can even be bifurcated.70 A particular technology may provide for more or
less robust, granular, or transparent choices for security. That limits how
effectively security can implement privacy. It does not, however, challenge
the legitimacy of privacy choices in selecting the desired end state.
Informally, though, there are two interactions between security and
privacy. The first parallels how Lawrence Lessig’s New Chicago School
anticipates interplay between law and code.71
Different security
architectures make privacy regimes more or less tenable, thereby
influencing their development and adoption. Multiuser operating systems
such as Unix offered greater granularity of control, and hence more finely
tuned privacy in their data, than operating systems such as the early variants
of Windows, which did not segregate information, even if they formally
allowed users to log on with different credentials.72 Moreover, systems
where data has a temporally defined existence, such as with Vanish’s selfdestructing documents, make it possible to envision privacy models where
data transfers are of limited duration rather than complete transfers.73
Similarly, privacy theories will generate development of technologies that
make their implementation possible. Worries about data aggregation in a
time of near-costless storage and indexing helped drive firms offering Web
browsers to implement anonymous surfing options, such as Google
Chrome’s incognito mode.74
The second interaction occurs with the selection of the security
precautions to be taken. For example, regulation of medical records may
require that only those treating a patient or covering her care via insurance
have the capability to access her protected health information.75 However,
a hospital may put in place a security mechanism that fails to enforce this
mandate—or, at least, fails to do so rigorously.76 The hospital may do so
innocently or deliberately.
It may have incompetent information
technology staff, or it may be shirking the cost of putting a more capable
70

Bambauer, supra note 65, at 630.
See Lessig, supra note 29, at 662–66.
72 STUART MCCLURE ET AL., HACKING EXPOSED: NETWORK SECURITY SECRETS &
SOLUTIONS 90, 121 (4th ed. 2003) (explaining that more granular control includes more
options, for example, the option to allow a user to access information, but not to alter it).
73 See
Overview, VANISH: SELF-DESTRUCTING DIGITAL DATA, http://vanish.cs.
washington.edu/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2013).
74 See Incognito Mode (Browse in Private), CHROME, http://support.google.com/chrome/
bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=95464 (last visited Mar. 17, 2013).
75 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(1) (2012).
76 See, e.g., News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Massachusetts
Provider Settles HIPAA Case for $1.5 Million (Sept. 17, 2012), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/09/20120917a.html.
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system in place. Yet even when the hospital is knowingly shortchanging
privacy safeguards, this is a problem of implementation, not of guiding
values. The hospital does not object to the level of privacy protection for
health information. It simply does not want to bear the cost of providing
it.77 Presumably, if its security costs were completely covered (say, if a
per-patient assessment for the new system were levied), the hospital would
be entirely willing, or at least indifferent towards, implementing more
robust security.
The question of security costs is one about system design: burdened
parties will be tempted to shirk costly responsibilities. To counteract the
lure of evading these burdens, the system must supply resources to the
burdened party, monitor its behavior, threaten it with ex post sanctions, or
impose some other constraint.78 These problems are challenging, but they
are standard questions of regulatory theory.
The harder question regarding cost is that it may point out a
disjunction between normative choices in the abstract and burdens in
reality. While privacy policy is not made in a vacuum, it is also difficult to
treat it as part of a comprehensive menu of choices. Funds spent on
protecting consumer financial information cannot be spent on additional
customer service personnel, or on improving banks’ website usability for
disabled users. And enforcement efforts to ensure banks are meeting their
privacy obligations cannot be employed to monitor their workplace safety
or compliance with antidiscrimination rules in employment. Thus,
structural features of policymaking, along perhaps with cognitive biases in
decisionmaking, may lead to privacy choices that we like in theory but are
unwilling to pay for in practice.79
Privacy determines who ought to be able to access, use, and alter
information. It justifies these choices with reference to larger values—
values that compete for priority and attention. Security implements that set
of choices. While entities may contest who should cover the costs of
security, that fight is separate from the negotiations over how access and
77

See generally Peter Kilbridge, The Cost of HIPAA Compliance, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1423 (2003) (quantifying the costs of HIPAA compliance for hospitals).
78 On monitoring, see 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4 (2006 & Supp. 2012) (implementing § 404 of
the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376, 1571 (2010)); on sanctions, see 45 C.F.R. § 160.402 (2012) (imposing civil
penalties for violations of HIPAA); on subsidies, see Amitai Aviram, Network Responses to
Network Threats: The Evolution into Private Cybersecurity Associations, in THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF CYBERSECURITY 143, 149 (Mark F. Grady & Francesco Parisi eds., 2006)
(“Public subsidies of private network security efforts may be appropriate in some cases
because of the significant positive externalities network security confers on people who are
not network members . . . .”).
79 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 54, at 31–33 (discussing optimism bias).
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alteration rights ought to be allocated; rather, it is simply over who pays for
making those decisions a reality.
IV. KEEP ’EM SEPARATED
Paying attention to the distinction between privacy and security has
important consequences. At a theoretical level, it concentrates attention on
issues where normative models differ versus instances that demonstrate
failures of implementation. To borrow an example from computer science
researcher Christopher Soghoian, whether the California company Biofilm
should ask for, and then retain, customers’ e-mail addresses as the price of a
sample of the personal lubricant Astroglide is a privacy question.80 It was a
security problem when Biofilm accidentally made those addresses available
on its Web server.81 When customers submitted their information to
Biofilm, both parties wanted to keep that data between them. Customers
gained no benefit from the inadvertent disclosure. And Biofilm’s goals did
not change—it did not release the information in pursuit of greater revenue
or more targeted marketing. It was simply a mistake.
From a utilitarian perspective, privacy issues are a zero-sum game. If
firms can track users’ activities on their own websites (and perhaps other
ones) and retain that data, they gain relative to a “do-not-track” regime
where they cannot do so.82 Users’ gains are inversely correlated: they
benefit more from a regime where they can elect to reveal information to
websites versus one where they cannot. Security issues, by contrast, result
in an outcome that is worse for both sides.83 After the breach above,
Biofilm is worse off, and its consumers are worse off.84 That difference
80

See Ryan Singel, Security Researcher Wants Lube Maker Fined for Privacy Slip,
WIRED (July 10, 2007, 5:35 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2007/07/securityresear/; Christopher Soghoian, Astroglide Data Loss Could Result in $18 Million Fine,
SLIGHT PARANOIA (July 9, 2007), http://paranoia.dubfire.net/2007/07/astroglide-data-losscould-result-in-18.html.
81 See Singel, supra note 80; Soghoian, supra note 80.
82 Robert N. Charette, Online Advertisers Turning up the Heat Against Making “Do Not
Track” Browsers’ Default Setting, IEEE SPECTRUM (Oct. 15, 2012, 3:43 PM),
http://spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/computing/it/online-advertisers-turning-up-the-heatagainst-defaulting-browsers-to-do-not-track-setting.
83 See Alessandro Acquisti et al., Is There a Cost to Privacy Breaches? An Event Study
2–4 (2006) (paper prepared for Twenty-Seventh International Conference on Information
Systems and Workshop on the Economics of Information Security), available at
http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/papers/acquisti-friedman-telang-privacy-breaches.pdf
(documenting negative effects of data breaches on stock prices).
84 Those who access the data without permission gain a benefit. In the Biofilm case,
security researcher Soghoian discovered the mistake (and also the list of users who received
free Astroglide). While this problem of unauthorized third-party benefits is one that is
theoretically challenging for utilitarianism, in practice it is conventional to discount or
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between security and privacy has important ramifications for regulation.
At a practical level, this approach suggests that when disputes involve
security flaws, rather than privacy debates, courts should permit liability at
a much lower threshold of harm and fault or blameworthiness. Security
might be conceptualized as akin to a contractual bargain between those who
supply data and those who hold it.85 And contract, unlike tort, is a doctrine
of strict liability.86 Courts do not care whether a breaching party is
blameworthy, or whether the harm resulting from a breach is weighty or
small. Merely showing breach is sufficient.87
Alternatively, one might envision security within tort law’s
framework.88 Firms could be held to owe a duty to the subjects of the
information they possess, or even to society generally, to securely store and
handle data.89 Security failures could be evaluated under strict liability
(firms bear the entire cost of the harm their insecurity creates), under a
negligence standard (firms only bear costs when they have failed to meet
some criterion for security), or both (such as strict liability for data leaks
and negligence for hacking).90 Tort law may be preferable since it offers
the possibility of compensating those harmed by security failures, even if
only nominally, and of imposing greater deterrence ex ante through the
threat of punitive damages.91
Finally, one might approach security from the perspective of criminal
law, by conditioning liability upon a blameworthy mental state. As with
scienter in tort, the level of mens rea could be reduced, such as to

exclude altogether that utility from the calculus. A principled reason for this approach is that
it forces would-be attackers to enter the privacy market: they should bargain with Biofilm
rather than trying to pry data from its servers. A more problematic reason is to deprecate
certain types of utility for moral reasons; however, this requires importing an external
normative framework into the putatively neutral utilitarian calculus.
85 The analogy only runs so far. Society should not countenance blanket waivers of
security by entities that hold data, particularly given that self-help—in the form of reading
terms of service and selecting among competing firms—is infeasible at best. See, e.g.,
McDonald & Cranor, supra note 50, at 565–68.
86 Robert D. Cooter, Economic Theories of Legal Liability, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 11, 12
(1991).
87 Curtis Bridgeman, Reconciling Strict Liability with Corrective Justice in Contract
Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 3013, 3017 (2007).
88 See, e.g., Vincent R. Johnson, Credit-Monitoring Damages in Cybersecurity Tort
Litigation, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 113 (2011).
89
See Michael D. Scott, Tort Liability for Vendors of Insecure Software: Has the Time
Finally Come?, 67 MD. L. REV. 425, 442–50 (2008).
90 See id. at 441–50 (discussing negligence).
91 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic
Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 896–900 (1998).
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negligence, or even eliminated, as with strict liability.92 And as with strict
liability crimes generally, security failures might be punished without the
traditional requirement of blameworthiness because these violations are
seen as less morally culpable.93 Security breaches will less typically
involve situations where the defendant benefits directly. Society is more
likely to condemn actions where a defendant gains from his crimes than
where his benefit may be minimal (the cost of some precautions not taken)
or even negative (such as market harm from breaches).94
Thus, security failures generally leave everyone involved (except for
the attacker) worse off. Privacy failures, by contrast, typically involve a
transfer of utility between parties: if Biofilm sold the e-mail addresses
rather than losing them, it would be enriched, and the Astroglide samplers
would be worse off. Thus, privacy disputes involve courts or regulators
deciding whether such transfers should be sanctioned. Security problems
destroy utility. Society should have less hesitation about imposing liability
for actions (or inactions) that only reduce utility.
This framework also suggests that current approaches to security
problems are misguided, and even harmful. Even insecure data controllers
rarely face significant liability to the subjects of the information.95 Courts
typically dispose of tort-based claims by the subjects on one or both of two
grounds: duty and causation.96 They hold that the data controller bears no
duty towards the data subjects, and hence there is a lack of a prima facie
cause of action.97 (Courts are often dishonest in their analyses: lack of duty
is a legal conclusion, not a factual state that compels a legal conclusion.)
Second, courts typically find either that the data subjects have not suffered
any harm or that harm is not attributable to the breach.98 Even from a
compensation perspective, this seems faulty: data subjects must bear the
risk of harm until it materializes, rather than the data controller, which
likely can avoid spills at lower cost and probably has better access to
92 See generally Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Law Reform and the Persistence of Strict
Liability, 62 DUKE L.J. 285 (2012) (describing rationales for states’ implementation of strictliability crimes).
93 See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 616–18 (1994); Darryl K. Brown, Criminal
Law’s Unfortunate Triumph over Administrative Law, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 657, 671
(2011).
94 See, e.g., Meghan J. Ryan, Proximate Retribution, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1049 (2012).
95 See Bambauer, supra note 67, at 58.
96 Sasha Romanosky & Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy Costs and Personal Data
Protection: Economic and Legal Perspectives, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1061, 1078–81
(2009).
97 See, e.g., Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2012).
98 See, e.g., Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 41–44 (3d Cir. 2011); Romanosky &
Acquisti, supra note 96, at 1078–79.
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insurance markets.99 And from a deterrence perspective, this outcome is
entirely wrong: it enables data holders to evade liability regardless of the
level of precautions that they take, since an adjudicating court will never
reach even a negligence analysis. While public enforcement occurs
irregularly, such as through the Federal Trade Commission, this is
insufficient to create a realistic threat of costs to press data controllers to
take proper security measures.100 Imposing something akin to strict liability
for data spills is preferable: holding them liable for all proved harm would
at least give data subjects the opportunity to prove loss, and the risk of
punitive damages (even cabined by recent Supreme Court jurisprudence101)
would foster deterrence.
In contrast, pure privacy claims should be treated with far more
caution. An example is the litigation—and, in European countries,
potential prosecution—over Google Street View.102 As part of Google’s
mapping of streets and roads, the company has captured imagery of private
homes, people entering bars, and even people in states of undress.103
Google has faced potential civil and criminal liability for its actions, along
with some level of opprobrium. Here, though, there are competing
normative claims. Google is engaged in an activity that creates significant
social benefit. The people whose travels, nakedness, and homes are made
more public than expected have been relying on practical obscurity to
protect their privacy. It is not obvious that Google’s claims must yield
pride of place.
There are important policy questions embedded in this Article’s

99 See, e.g., Pamela Lewis Dolan, Thinking of Buying Data Breach Insurance? Here Are
Some Things to Consider, AMEDNEWS.COM (Jan. 31, 2011), http://www.ama-assn.org/
amednews/2011/01/31/bica0131.htm.
100 See Andrew Serwin, The Federal Trade Commission and Privacy: Defining
Enforcement and Encouraging the Adoption of Best Practices, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 809,
854–56 (2011).
101 See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003)
(holding that a ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages of 145 to 1 was
excessive).
102 W.J. Hennigan, Google Pays Pennsylvania Couple $1 in Street View Lawsuit, L.A.
TIMES (Dec. 2, 2010, 12:13 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2010/12/
google-lawsuit-street.html; Seth Weintraub, Google’s Streetview Victorious in European
Courts, CNNMONEY (Mar. 21, 2011, 6:36 PM), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2011/03/21/
googles-streetview-victorious-in-european-courts/.
103 Matt Hickman, 9 Things You Probably Shouldn’t Do in the Presence of a Google
Street View Vehicle, MOTHER NATURE NETWORK (Oct. 4, 2012, 7:05 PM),
http://www.mnn.com/lifestyle/arts-culture/stories/9-things-you-probably-shouldnt-do-in-thepresence-of-a-google-street-; Artist Captures Bizarre Images Shot by Google’s Street View
Cameras, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 6, 2012, 3:31 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/
entertainment/bizarre-images-captured-google-street-view-cameras-gallery-1.1214757.
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approach. For example, at what level of fault or intent should liability be
imposed for security breaches? The correct answer is likely to vary by
industry, and perhaps even more granularly than that. There are at least two
important factors. First, what fraction of the implementation costs does the
potential defendant bear? Is it able to pass these expenses through to its
customers at low transaction cost? A lower liability threshold might be
appropriate where the holder of the data has a pecuniary incentive to shirk
its duties. Second, is there any risk that this security problem is, in fact, a
privacy problem? The data owner, for example, might have neglected
security because doing so better enabled it to exploit the data. Here, too,
liability at a lower threshold of fault or blameworthiness is useful as a
channeling function: data owners should take up privacy fights directly,
rather than using security as indirect means to attain their goals.104 These
questions, while critical to successful implementation, are technical ones.
They bear not on what ends are to be achieved, but rather on the
mechanisms to achieve them.
V. CONCLUSION
Security and privacy can, and should, be treated as distinct concerns.
Privacy discourse involves difficult normative decisions about competing
claims to legitimate access to, use of, and alteration of information. It is
about selecting among different philosophies and choosing how various
rights and entitlements ought to be ordered. Security implements those
choices—it mediates between information and privacy selections.
Importantly, this approach argues that security failings should be penalized
more readily, and more heavily, than privacy ones, because there are no
competing moral claims to resolve and because security flaws make all
parties worse off.

104

As one example, in 2011, Google began encrypting searches by users signed in to its
services. The new search encryption prevents websites that users visited by clicking on a
result from obtaining referrer data that reveal the terms that the users searched. However,
Google still transmits referrer data when a user clicks an ad. Search engine optimization
(SEO) firms objected to the first change, and some privacy advocates objected to continued
transmission of referrer data with ads. The critique of Google was that it guised the change
in security terms, while the major effect was to drive website owners onto the company’s
search optimization tools and away from competing SEO firms. See Danny Sullivan,
Google to Begin Encrypting Searches & Outbound Clicks by Default with SSL Search,
SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Oct. 18, 2011, 2:09 PM), http://searchengineland.com/google-tobegin-encrypting-searches-outbound-clicks-by-default-97435.
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